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Abstract. There has been growing interest in green management practices among practi-
tioners, researchers and regulators in recent years. However, there is limited research that 
examines the connection between natural environments and human resource management 
practices. The current study examined the relationship between Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) compensation and green management practices within the agency theory and insti-
tutional theory frameworks. Results revealed a significant negative relationship between 
green management practices and CEO base pay, however, there was not a significant 
relationship between green management practices and CEO bonuses. In line with previous 
agency theory research, findings suggest a negative relationship between state regulation 
and CEO compensation in green states. An important implication for practice is that 
the negative relationship may strengthen negative perceptions about green management 
practices among CEOs and reduce willingness to implement green management practices.
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Introduction
Today, “we live in an era of sustainability awareness” (Starik, Marcus 2000: 539) and 
there is growing pressure on organizations to adopt green practices. Environmental 
sustainability has become a strategic issue for organizations and the topic has generated 
concerns among business executives, governments, consumers, and management schol-
ars (Delmas, Toffel 2008; Gallarotti 1995; Orsato 2006; Rehman, Shrivastava 2011; Zee 
et al. 2011). This trend is due to the growing environmental and social movement and 
the perception that organizations have or could have significant impact on their respec-
tive ecosystems (Starik, Marcus 2000). With the growing pressures from the federal and 
local governments, society, consumers and competitors (Jackson et al. 2011), organiza-
97
tions are pressured to devote more of their resources to environmentally and socially 
responsible endeavors. 
Despite the growing emphasis on green management practices, the examination of the 
connection between natural environments and organizations is a relatively recent schol-
arly phenomenon (Renwick et al. 2008; Starik, Marcus 2000). As various stakeholders 
have been struggling with the challenges and opportunities presented by environmen-
tal issues, “Human resource management (HRM) scholars and practitioners alike have 
been relatively slow to engage in the ongoing discussions and debates” and research 
that examines the relationship between HRM and environmental management is scarce 
(Jackson et al. 2011). Although CEO (Chief Executive Officer) compensation is one of 
the most widely examined HRM topics (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin 1992; Tosi et al. 2000), 
we do not know enough about the relationship between green management practices and 
CEO compensation (Lothe, Myrtveit 2003; Renwick et al. 2008). There are only a few 
studies that have examined this relationship (e.g. Berrone, Gomez-Meja 2009; Cordeiro, 
Sarkis 2008; Gallarotti 1995; P. A. Stanwick, S. D. Stanwick 2001).
The fascination with CEO compensation is not recent. Articles on the topic of CEO 
compensation date back as far as 1925. Interest in the connection between CEO com-
pensation and green management issues has increased in recent years (Cordeiro, Sarkis 
2008; Essen et al. 2012; Moriarty 2009; O’Reilly III, Main 2007; Renwick et al. 2008). 
Compensation systems affect the CEOs’ perceptions about and efforts towards green 
management practices (Lothe, Myrtveit 2003). These perceptions, motivations and deci-
sions, in return, have a significant impact on managerial decision and on the environ-
ment (Cordeiro, Sarkis 2008). Therefore, examining the link between green manage-
ment practices and CEO compensation is of interest to both organizations and society. 
In this study, the relationship between green management practices and CEO compen-
sation is examined by expanding on agency theory and including insights from insti-
tutional theory. It is argued that laws and regulations, which is the most widely cited 
driver of green management practices (e.g. Barry et al. 1993; Rojšek 2001; Y. Yen, 
S. Yen 2012), create isomorphic pressures on organizations at the state level and affect 
the agent-principal relationship. It is proposed, based on agency theory that increased 
regulation will limit the discretion of the CEO and, therefore, have a negative effect on 
CEO compensation.
1. Theoretical background
The compensation system of an organization is partly determined by the environment 
in which it operates (Chu et al. 2006; Lawler 1987; Milkovich 1988). Among envi-
ronmental factors discussed in literature in relation to pay are labor unions, regulatory 
changes, and product and labor market pressures. Geographic variables such as location 
have also been significantly related to compensation (Krueger, Summers 1988). Institu-
tional theory, as a theory that explains the effect of external environmental pressures on 
organizations, received little attention from researchers in the field of human resource 
management (e.g. Berrone, Gomez-Meja 2009). In the following sections, institutional 
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theory will be discussed as it relates to green management practices and the agent-
principal relationship. It is argued that in states where isomorphic pressures to imple-
ment green management practices exist, CEO pay is lower due to the limited decision 
making power of the CEOs as suggested by agency theory.
1.1. Institutional theory
Traditionally, institutional theory described how isomorphic institutional pressures lead 
to common organizational practices (DiMaggio, Powell 1983). Isomorphism can be 
defined as pressures from social institutions to follow similar paths in management 
practices (DiMaggio, Powell 1983; Powell, DiMaggio 1991). There are three different 
forms of isomorphism including coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. Coer-
cive isomorphism results from the coercive forces from social institutions in the organi-
zation’s environment to adopt certain practices (Zucker 1987). Mimetic pressure, on the 
other hand, results from the organization’s motivation to imitate the behavior of other 
organizations in their institutional fields (Delmas, Toffel 2008). In a way, organizations 
try to copy and implement best practices or beneficial structures that they see in other 
organizations. The third source of isomorphic pressure is normative which results from 
pressures from the professional field. Formal education and the cognitive base produced 
in educational institutions as well as the growth and influence of professional networks 
allow new practices to be diffused across organizations (DiMaggio, Powell 1983). 
A review of the limited research in the field of green management practices reveals that 
these different types of isomorphic pressures (i.e. coercive, normative and mimetic) dis-
cussed above have different sources and consequences. Coercive or normative pressures 
come from institutional agents, such as the state, local community, interest groups and 
professional bodies, whereas mimetic influences stem from similar or related organiza-
tions (DiMaggio, Powell 1983). For example, in businesses fields where green manage-
ment practices bring economic returns, there will be mimetic pressures on organiza-
tions to implement similar practices and they will voluntarily adopt green management 
practices (Starik, Marcus 2000; Zucker 1987). To the contrary, regulations pertaining to 
environmental policies coerce organizations to adopt green management practices (i.e. 
coercive isomorphism). “Since the 1960s, organizations have found themselves under 
increasing institutional pressure to attend to
environmental sustainability as part of their corporate agenda” (Walls, Hoffman 2012: 
1). While regulatory pressures, market competitive pressures and customer pressures 
have been identified as the main drivers of green management (Rehman, Shrivastava 
2011), regulatory pressures is the most widely cited driver of green management (Barry 
et al. 1993; Livingstone, Sparks 1994; Murphy et al. 1995; Pohlen, Farris 1992; Rojšek 
2001; Winsemius, Guntram 1992; BearingPoint … 2008; Y. Yen, S. Yen 2012; Lai, 
Wong 2012; Bose, Pal 2012; De Giovanni 2012; Green et al. 1996; Nawrocka 2008). 
Many organizations respond to institutional pressures by adhering to accepted and legiti-
mated environmental standards (Walls, Hoffman 2012). According to Kulwiec (2002) 
there are hundreds of laws and regulations within individual states making regulatory 
pressures the most important driver among all. Although many organizations have start-
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ed responding to environmental issues proactively and viewing environmental issues as 
a part of the organization’s strategy in recent years (Gallarotti 1995; Walls et al. 2012; 
Walls, Hoffman 2012), for many organizations the objective of implementing green 
management practices is still to avoid sanctions associated with failing to meet govern-
ment rules or regulations (Delmas, Toffel 2004, 2008). 
Jennings and Zandbergen (1995) were amongst the first to apply institutional theory 
to explain firms’ adoption of environmental management practices. They argue that 
coercive forces, primarily in the form of regulatory enforcement, have been the main 
motivators for organizations to adopt environmental management practices. Federal 
and local governments impose coercive pressure on organizations to implement similar 
practices through regulatory enforcement and companies adopt green management prac-
tices to avoid sanctions (Delmas, Toffel 2004; Gallarotti 1995). Several studies found 
that company decisions to adopt environmental management practices were influenced 
by the desire to improve or maintain relations with their communities (Delmas, Toffel 
2004, 2008). Not surprisingly many green management initiatives have been at the state 
level (see Bose, Pal 2012; Clean Energy States Alliance 2004; Kulwiec 2002; Rogers, 
Trüb 2008; Wingfield, Marcus 2007) and they have resulted from coercive and norma-
tive pressures from local governments and NGOs. In addition to federal laws regarding 
green management practices, states have their own rules and regulations. Similarly, 
local professional organizations help increase awareness about environmental issues 
and shape norms in their respective fields, set certain standards and in a way pressure 
organizations to implement green management practices though normative isomorphism 
(Zucker 1987). 
Organizations located in the same state are exposed to the same rules and regulations 
(i.e. coercive pressures) and affected by the norms of NGOs (ex. Clean Energy States 
Alliance 2004) to adopt similar green management practices. Since the activities of 
NGOs and regulations differ from state to state, some states are greener than others 
(Rogers, Trüb 2008; Wingfield, Marcus 2007). In sum, institutional pressures are strong-
er in some states than others which results in similar practices within the state but dis-
similar practices across states (Delmas, Toffel 2008).
1.2. Agency theory
Most research on CEO pay has an agency-theoretic orientation (Balkin et al. 2000; 
Cordeiro, Sarkis 2008). Agency theory explains the relationship between the principal 
and the agent in which one party (principal/owner) delegates work to another (agent/
manager). Agency problem arises when the interests and goals of the agents and princi-
pals are in conflict. These conflicts may be over the amount of effort to be exerted, risk 
to be borne, or strategic choices (Cordeiro, Sarkis 2008; Davis 2005; Shapiro 2005). 
Agency cost refers to the cost of resolving conflicts between the principals and agents 
and aligning interests of the two groups (Eisenhardt 1989). Compensation contracts are 
designed to align CEO’s financial interests with the company interests to reduce agency 
related problems (Arya, Sun 2004; Chu et al. 2006).
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Several previous studies have focused on the effect of regulation on CEO compensa-
tion within the agency framework. Research to date suggests that there is a signifi-
cant negative relationship between regulation and CEO compensation (Lin, Su 2009). 
Crawford, Ezzell and Miles (1995) showed a relationship between CEO’s compensation 
and regulatory changes in the banking industry in the early 1980s. Hubbard and Palia 
(1995) found higher levels of CEO pay for banks operating in more competitive envi-
ronments. Kole and Lehn (1999) found a significant relationship between deregulation 
in the airline industry and CEO compensation. Bryan et al. (2005) showed a significant 
relationship between CEO compensation and deregulation in the electric-utility industry. 
Similarly, Arya and Sun (2004) found that annual CEO compensation increased follow-
ing the 1992 Energy Policy Act and the deregulation of the electric and utilities industry. 
The negative relationship between regulation in the industry and CEO compensation 
may be partly due to information asymmetry. Usually principle is unsure whether the 
agent has performed the work or whether he/she engaged in opportunistic behavior. 
Information asymmetry reduces the principal’s ability to control actions of the agent 
(Arnold, Lange 2004). The greater the discretion of the agent, the greater the potential 
for opportunistic behavior. From an agency theory perspective, CEO compensation is 
higher in competitive environments because the greater freedom in the environment 
provides greater discretion to the agent (CEO) in decision making. Therefore, the poten-
tial for the decisions to be in conflict with the interests of the principals (shareholders) 
increases. Although literature on executive compensation suggests that interests may be 
aligned and agency costs may be reduced by tying the manager’s compensation directly 
to firm performance or firm value, there is no concrete theoretical or empirical consen-
sus on the impact of different forms of compensation on managerial decisions (Core 
et al. 2003; Murphy 1999). In many organizations, principals choose to pay the CEO’s 
high levels of compensation so that they work in the best interest of the organization. 
The greater the pay, the greater the potential loss faced by the CEO (Shapiro 2005). 
On the other hand, regulations set limitations to the scope of the CEO’s job, reduce 
the manager’s investment discretion, increase monitoring and political pressure (Bryan 
et al. 2000; Joskow et al. 1996; Smith, Watts 1992).
Coercive and normative pressures imposed on organizations towards the implementa-
tion of green practices increase regulation in firms (Gallarotti 1995; P. A. Stanwick, 
S. D. Stanwick 2001) and restrict decision making freedom of CEOs. The decision-
making power of CEOs will be limited by rules of green management practices and the 
chances that the decisions of the agent (CEO) will be in conflict with the interests of the 
principal (shareholder) will be lower. Lower discretion in decision making will be accom-
panied by lower CEO pay. Therefore, CEOs compensation will be lower in green states. 
H1: There is a negative relationship between green management practices and CEO pay 
levels. CEO base pay will be lower in green states. 
Earlier studies on regulation and CEO compensation have documented that regulated 
firms are less likely to use incentive-based compensation, such as bonuses and stock 
options, than unregulated firms (e.g., Bryan et al. 2000; J. J. Gaver, K. M. Gaver 1993). 
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Increased constraints discussed above reduce the need to pay management bonuses, 
stock options and other incentive-based compensation in addition to a base salary 
(Bryan et al. 2000). CEO’s of firms in unregulated industries have more discretion in 
decision making and, therefore, they have more power to effect company performance 
and shareholder wealth. In order to align the interests of the principal (shareholders) 
and the agent (CEO) and to make sure CEOs work towards the achievement of high or-
ganizational performance, CEO bonuses needs to be tied to organizational performance 
in unregulated firms (Arya, Sun 2004; Joskow et al. 1996). The objective of bonuses 
or stock options is to provide incentives to the CEO to make shareholder wealth maxi-
mizing decision. Regulated firms, on the other hand, will rely less on incentive based 
compensation such as bonuses, than unregulated firms because regulations will limit the 
scope of the CEO’s job (Arya, Sun 2004; Joskow et al. 1996). Therefore:
H2: There is a negative relationship between green management practices and CEO 
bonuses. CEO bonuses will be lower in green states. 
2. Data and methods
Data was collected from the Hoover’s (2008) database. Only companies in the United 
States that had 100 or more employees were included in the study. Companies with less 
than 100 employees are considered small companies (Cullen 2002). They were excluded 
from the study because they may not have the resources necessary to implement green 
management practices (Gallarotti 1995). Also, low-wage and high-wage industries were 
selected based on lietarature prior to data collection to make sure both groups were 
represented in the sample (Erdil, Yetkiner 2001; Krueger, Summers 1988; Neal 1993; 
Thaler 1989; Wolfson, Belman 2004). Industries included in the study are the following: 
semiconductor, energy and utilities, telecommunication equipment, chemicals, computer 
software, metals and mining, apparel retail, telecommunication services, consumer ser-
vices, restaurant, and agriculture industries. Companies that were listed in the Hoover’s 
database in the selected industries which had 100 or more employees and which had 
CEO pay and bonus records available were included in the data. None of the states in 
the United States were excluded from the study. Table 1 shows the distribution of com-
panies based on industry and green management practices.
2.1. Measures
To ensure internal validity, a study must be designed in such a way that rival hypotheses 
are ruled out and spurious covariance among study variables are minimized or removed. 
Based on a review of compensation literature, company age and size, measured in terms 
of company sales, were included as a control variables in the analyses (Berrone, Gomez-
Mejia 2009; Cordeiro, Sarkis 2008). 
The green states were identified based on Forbes listing of green states (Wingfield, 
Marcus 2007) and 2008 Business Facilities Rankings Report (Rogers, Trüb 2008). These 
states were also members of the Clean Energy States Alliance. Only the states included 
in the top 15 of the two lists were included as green states in this study. The rankings 
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Table 1. Distribution of companies included in the study based on industry  











of companies  
in green states
Agriculture 9 1.3 1 11%
Chemicals 71 10.5 26 37%
Computer software 65 9.6 42 65%
Consumer services 27 4.0 10 37%
Electronics – 
semiconductor
207 30.7 129 62%
Energy and utilities 41 6.1 7 17%
Leisure – restaurants 47 7.0 14 30%
Metals and mining 47 7.0 7 15%
Retail – apparel 42 6.2 21 50%
Telecommunication 
equipment
49 7.3 27 55%
Telecommunication 
services
69 10.2 25 36%
Table 2. Criteria used in determining green states
Categories, listed in order of weight, used to formulate the Top 10 Greenest States  
in the Business Facilities Rankings Report 2008 (Rogers, Trüb 2008)
Total Pollution Released by Pounds of Toxins
Financial incentives for Energy Efficiency
Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy
Rules, Regulations, and Policies for Renewable Energy 
Rules, Regulations, and Policies for Energy Efficiency 
Number of LEED-certified Buildings 
Number of Hazardous Waste Sites by State
Total Air Emissions 
Percentage of People who Use Public Transportation 
Equally weighted categories used to formulate America’s Greenest States  




Hazardous waste management 
Policy initiatives 
Energy consumption
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mainly relied on the states’ policies regarding renewable energy and waste manage-
ment and focus on efficiency and environmental policy initiatives (See Table 2). The 
green states included in the study based on these rankings are California, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin. The non-
green states include Arkansas, Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Massa-
chusetts, Utah, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Washington. 46% of companies were located or headquartered in green states and 54% 
in non-green states (See Table 1).
CEO base pay and bonus pay, the dependt variable data, was obtained from the Hoo-
ver’s (2008) database. 
The primary statistical techniques used to analyze data in this study included descriptive 
statistics, bivariate correlations (Pearson product moment correlations) (Table 3), and 
multivariate hierarchical regression (Tables 4 and 5). 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 673)
Mean St. Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6
Public-Private (1)
Public 1, Private 0 .96 .19 1
Green-Non Green  
States (2)
Green 1, Non Green 0
.46 .50 –.03 1
Company Sales (3) 3122.39 10843.50 .03 –.03 1
Company Age (4) 32.49 31.66 .12** –.13** .26** 1
Salary (5) 547468.84 480714.70 .01 –.10* .33** .21** 1
Bonus (6) 376043.77 1017969.94 .01 –.04 .29** .13** .23** 1
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed).
3. Results
Most of the intercorrelations among the variables in this study were in line with expec-
tations (see Table 4). There was a significant correlation between salary, company age, 
company sales and green states as expected. CEO bonus was significantly correlated 
with company sales and company age but not with green states. Whether the company 
was public or private was not significantly related to CEO salary or bonus. While bivari-
ate correlations may provide some evidence for main effects, they might be misleading 
when independent variables are correlated (Greve 2003). Therefore, hierarchical multi-
variate regression was used when testing hypotheses.
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of hierarchical multivariate regression analyses for both 
CEO base pay and bonus. In order to understand the effect of each independent variable, 
control variables were entered first and independent variable was entered next. Model 
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1 in each table presents the regression results of the control variables on the dependent 
variable. By looking at the following models, we can see how the explanatory power 
of the model changes according to each independent variable added.
Hypothesis 1 proposes a negative relationhsip between green management practices and 
CEO base pay whereas hypothesis 2 proposes a negative relationship between green 
management practices and CEO bonuses. According to Model 2 in Table 4, CEO base 
pay is lower in greener states and the relationsip is significant (p < 0.05) supporting 
hypothesis 1. Model 2 in Table 5 reveals no significant relationship between green 
management practices and CEO bonuses although the relationship is in the expected 
direction. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is not supported.
Table 4. Results of the regression analysis for CEO base pay (N = 659)
Variables Model 1 (Controls only) Model 2 (H2)
Controls
Company Sales .30*** .30***







Notes: Standardized coefficients are shown. Significance levels: * p < .05. ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
Table 5. Results of the regression analysis for CEO bonus (N = 658)
Variables Model 1 (Controls only) Model 2 (H2)
Controls
Company Sales .27*** .27***







Notes: Standardized coefficients are shown. Significance levels: * p < .05. ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
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Conclusions and discussions
Green management and CEO compensation are two fields of study that have received 
considerable attention in the last few years. Although we live in an era of sustainability 
awareness as stated by Starik and Marcus (2000), we do not know much about how 
green management initiatives impact human resource management practices in general 
and CEO compensation in particular (Jackson et al. 2011). Gallarotti published the 
article titled “It pays to be green” in 1995 and drew attention to the link between mana-
gerial incentive structure and environmentally sound strategies. While environmental 
studies have proliferated in recent years, studies examining the link between CEO pay 
and green management practices are limited (e.g. Berrone, Gomez-Mejia 2009). 
This study contributes to research in the field by expanding on agency theory and 
including insights from institutional theory as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) and Ber-
rone and Gomez-Meja (2009). Studies to date suggest that isomorphic pressures at the 
state level affect the adoption of green management practices by organizations (Kulwiec 
2002; Delmas, Toffel 2004, 2008); however few empirical studies have examined green 
management practices within the institutional theory framework. Another contribution 
of this study is the examination of the link between natural environments and human 
resource management practices. Results show that there is a significant relationship 
between CEO pay and green management practices. Results suggest that CEO base 
bay is lower in states where isomorphic pressures to implement green management 
practices are higher.
The negative relationship between green management practices and CEO compensa-
tion in the current study is in line with previous studies, for example studies examining 
the effect of deregulation in the electric industry and CEO compensation (e.g. Arya, 
Sun 2004; Bryan et al. 2005). Studies to date show a negative relationship between 
regulation and CEO compensation. However, in this study regulation was negatively 
related to CEO base pay but not to bonuses. Future studies should include voluntary 
versus mandatory implementation of green management practices as a control variable. 
It is possible that when organizations voluntarily implement green management prac-
tices and turn them into competitive advantage, such as greater customer demand or 
greater operational efficiency, firm profitability increases which in turn reflects on CEO 
bonuses. Future studies should also include company performance, such as firm profit-
ability, as a control variable in the analysis since bonuses are mostly tied to company 
performance (Essen et al. 2012).
Contrary to our expectations, CEO bonus was not lower in green states. 
These results have important implications because CEOs will not be motivated to im-
plement green management practices unless there is a positive relationship between 
green management practices and CEO compensation (i.e. base pay and bonus). From 
an agency theory perspective, unless the interests of the CEO are aligned with company 
results, there is potential for opportunistic behavior. CEO may choose decisions that are 
in line with their own personal interest. Furthermore, the negative relationship between 
green management practices and CEO base pay that the results revealed may strengthen 
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negative perceptions about green management practices. CEOs have decision making 
power on issues that affect the survival and success of organizations as well as the soci-
ety as a whole. The lack of incentives provided to CEOs may hinder green management 
practice adoption and implementation by firms due to the negative perceptions of CEOs. 
This study offers an alternative by examining environmental management practices 
from an institutional theory perspective. Majority of the studies in the field of envi-
ronmental management used ISO 14001 adoption and pollution indices such as U.S. 
EPA’s toxic release inventory (e.g. Berrone, Gomez-Mejia 2009; Delmas, Toffel 2008; 
King, Lenox 2002; Sharma 2000) as measures of environmental management. The EPA 
inventory consists of firms only from industries that are subject to reporting under the 
EPA’s program which requires facilities exceeding a threshold level to report their emis-
sions (Berrone, Gomez-Mejia 2009). This study has a broader focus and includes mul-
tiple industries. Considering that the service sector rather than the manufacturing sector 
dominates the Unites States economy, it is important to understand CEO compensation 
in a wide range of industries.
From that perspective, the high representation of the semi-conductor industry in the 
sample is both strength and a weakness of the current study. While it is important to 
understand CEO compensation in the service sector, our sample is not representative of 
all industries. Even though the sample was balanced in terms of percentage of compa-
nies in green versus non-green states, future studies should work with a more balanced 
represenation of industries in the sample. Also, this study can be replicated applying the 
questionnaire method and directly contacting organizations to learn about their green 
management practices. 
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